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This paper has two main purposes: first, to argue against the monovalent conceptualization of 
knowledge implicitly or explicitly held by many authors and instead to develop a 
characterization that recognizes the rich and varied ways in which human beings may be said “to 
know”. Second, to point out and conceptualize a fundamental dimension of knowledge that is 
generally ignored or cursorily treated within the literature, that is, “truth”. The paper draws on 
previous work that developed a theory of information and meaning based on the embodied nature 
of cognition. It identifies four forms of knowledge – propositional, experiential, performative 
and epistemological – and explores their characteristics, especially in terms of truth and validity. 












Although knowledge management has established itself as a bona fide subject both in practice 
[24] and in the academic world [66], there has been, and remains, considerable debate about the 
underlying concepts of “knowledge”, “information” and even “data”.  
The purpose of this paper is two- fold. First, to argue against the monovalent conceptualization of 
knowledge implicitly or explicitly held by many authors and instead to develop a 
characterization that recognizes the rich and varied ways in which human beings may be said “to 
know”. Second, to point out and conceptualize a fundamental dimension of knowledge that is 
generally ignored or cursorily treated within the literature, that is “truth”. It is fundamental to a 
proper definition of knowledge as opposed to mere opinion or belief that knowledge has some 
claim to truth. Indeed, the classical philosophical definition of knowledge, since Plato, is that 
knowledge is “true, justified belief”. In this paper I shall argue that this is an over-simplistic view 
of truth, particularly given the polyvalent nature of knowledge, and will outline different forms 
of, or criteria for, truth which may be appropriate for the different forms of knowledge.  
The theory developed in the paper draws on previous work concerning the nature of information, 
data and meaning [17, 46, 47] and the extent to which cognition is embodied [50]. In extending 
this to consider knowledge and truth it brings in especially critical realism [6, 49, 51, 52] and 
critical theory [26, 31, 37]. 
The first section of the paper reviews the knowledge management literature to the extent that it 
concerns knowledge and truth and includes a brief review of the conception of information and 
meaning previously developed. The second section develops the polyvalent theory of knowledge; 
the third reviews theories of truth; and the fourth links truth to knowledge. Finally, the paper 
discusses the implications for knowledge management. 
Current Views of Knowledge and Information 
Within information systems it is conventional [2, 9, 15, 21] to draw up a ladder from data to 
information to knowledge, what Tuomi [72] calls the knowledge hierarchy, and this is mirrored 
in the move from data processing to information management to knowledge management so 
pronounced in the history of IS. For example, for Davenport and Prusak [15] data are discrete 
facts about the world which in themselves are meaningless; information is data that has been 
processed or interpreted within a particular context to inform or reduce uncertainty; while 
knowledge is information that is even more valuable because of the addition of insight, 
experience, context or interpretation [24]. Others who use the same basic model define 
knowledge in different ways. For example, knowledge is that which enables us to assign 
meaning to data [73]; knowledge consists of truths, beliefs, concepts, judgements and 
expectations [75]; or knowledge is tested, validated and codified information [19]. 
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Tuomi [72] actually argues the case for a reversed hierarchy, namely that knowledge precedes 
information which in turn precedes data. On this view, knowledge becomes articulated within a 
verbal and textual context to form an information structure. This may be embodied as a 
document, a diagram, a data structure or information system. Once this has become totally 
defined the “meaning” of the information is essentially fixed and this allows it to be populated or 
instantiated with items of data which would, by themselves, have no meaning at all. Put the other 
way round, data cannot exist without a pre-defined semantic and syntactic struc ture, which is 
information; and information is the articulation or explication of knowledge. 
Other authors have developed more complex categorizations of knowledge [42]. Millar et al [45] 
concentrate on what the knowledge is about and specify know-what, know-why, know-how, 
know-who, and experiential knowledge which can involve any of the others. Blackler [8], 
drawing on Collins [14], focuses on where the knowledge is situated and distinguishes between 
knowledge that is embrained (cognitive), embodied (perceptual), encultured (social), embedded 
(systematized), and encoded (formal or symbolic). Other classifications have been suggested by, 
for example, Winter [76], Fleck [20] and Benson [3]. Many writers (e.g., [68]) refer to the 
distinction between tacit knowledge and focal knowledge originated by Polanyi [55] and 
popularized by Nonaka and Takeuchi [53]. 
However, as has been pointed out by many commentators [70], the nature of knowledge itself is 
highly debatable and several authors are critical of the whole emphasis on knowledge as some 
objective, commodifiable entity. Alvesson and Karreman [1, p. 995] argue that knowledge “is an 
ambiguous, unspecific and dynamic phenomenon, intrinsically related to meaning, understanding 
and process and therefore difficult to  manage.” Marshall and Sapsed [42, p. 12] emphasize the 
“importance of considering knowledge not simply as a stable and unproblematic object that can 
be effectively decontextualised and freely circulated, but as a complex, dynamic, and situated 
series of processes.” In addition, they go on to argue that knowing is essentially active – to be 
able to act effectively within a social situation. In practice, though, the overwhelming approach 
within knowledge management is to take a resolutely functionalist reading of knowledge as 
Schultze and Leidner’s [66] research showed. They classified research articles on knowledge 
management between 1990 and 2000 into one of Deetz’s [16] four discourses of management – 
normative (functionalist), interpretive, dialogic (postmodern) or critical. Of the 75 papers, 71% 
were classified as normative with a further 25% being interpretive. 
There is not space in one paper to provide a detailed critique of all these approaches to the 
definition of knowledge and information, so I shall make some general points that will illustrate 
what I see as their weaknesses. 
1. With respect to the various versions of the knowledge hierarchy I would argue that they all 
suffer from inadequate and unclear conceptualizations of the nature of information and its 
possible relationships to knowledge. Mingers [47] carried out a thorough survey of existing 
theories of information, many based in some way on Shannon and Weaver’s [67] information 
theory, including socially sophisticated models such as Mackay [41] and Luhman [40]. These 
theories were evaluated in terms of four criteria: the generality of the theory; the pragmatic 
usefulness for information systems; the degree of integration with other disciplines; and 
lastly the correspondence with everyday usage. The approach that was judged most 
successful was that of Dretske [17] and this formed the basis of the theory of information and 
meaning that is summarized below [46]. 
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2. With respect to Tuomi’s reversed hierarchy there are aspects of this that are valuable. Clearly 
knowledge does structure that which can be information for us, and conditions the amount or 
extent of knowledge that is available from a particular source. Equally, data does rely on a 
pre-existing and consensual semantic and syntactic structure for it to be effective as data. 
However, I will argue that we need both hierarchies – data can carry information and, in 
certain circumstances, this information can then generate knowledge. At the same time a 
subject’s knowledge alters the information they can receive, and allows them to access the 
information in the first place. We thus need more of a interactive view. 
3. With regard more specifically to theories of knowledge, then there are three general 
problems. First, the very large number of papers that take a simplistic and unquestioning 
view of knowledge as an objective commodity. Second, those authors who do recognize 
different forms of knowledge point out particular and partial sets of distinctions based either 
on the object of knowledge, the form of knowledge, or the location of knowledge and do not 
thereby do justice to the richness of ways in which we talk of “knowing”. Third, as 
mentioned in the introduction, almost none of the literature considers the relation of 
knowledge to truth.  
Data, Information and Meaning 
Mingers [46] developed a theory of information and its relation to meaning based on Dretske’s 
[17] idea of the flow of information but incorporating ideas from Habermas’s [28] theory of 
communicative action and embedded within a critical realist philosophy [52]. This is now 
summarized. 
In our daily lives, we continually experience events of all kinds. Such events can be, and usually 
are, taken as signs that relate to other possible events or occurrences. The paw print in the ground 
shows that a dog has been around; the darkening clouds portend rain; the blue of a map is taken 
to symbolize water; the knock at the door shows that someone is there; the petrol gauge tells us 
the car is nearly empty; the database informs us of 35 widgets in stock; or the cry of “fire” 
triggers us into action.  
All of these events are taken by us as signs and can be said to carry  information about particular 
states of affairs in the world. A single event carries information, as Hartley [32] and Shannon and 
Weaver [67] saw, because it reveals a reduction in the possibilities of what might have happened. 
With the toss of a dice or the input of a particular data item into a computer, a range of 
possibilities are reduced to just one. The amount of information carried or generated by the event 
reflects the reduction in possibilities thus brought about. It is important to see that the 
information that is available from the event is independent of any observer. Indeed, the event 
might not be observed yet it still carries this information waiting to be tapped.  
From a semantic, communicational point of view however, what is important is not the amount 
of information, but its content – what it means. Dretske argues that the content of the information 
carried by a sign is that which is causally implied by the occurrence of the sign. In other words, 
what must be the case in the world given that the sign or event has occurred? Interestingly this is 
an almost identical transcendental approach to that of critical realism [4] – given some 
phenomena, what causal mechanism must have generated it? This formulation provides a 
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definition of information - information is the propositional content of a sign1. Thus, a sign 
carries information about the particular states of affairs that are implied by the occurrence of that 
sign. There are a number of consequences of this definition: 
1. Information is an objective commodity. It exists whether or not there are people to observe or 
extract it, and it can be stored and transmitted by artifacts, e.g. books, newspapers, TV sets 
and computers. 
2. However, the amount of information available to a particular person depends on their prior 
knowledge - in particular, their prior knowledge of the possible states of the world. For 
example, the message that the winner of a horse race was a grey carries more information for 
someone who knows there was only one grey than for someone who does not. Equally, a 
book written in a foreign language or a message in code carries information, but only for 
those knowing the language or code. 
3. Information can be transmitted along a chain provided that there are direct causal links. For 
example, people walking in a shopping mall cause changes in light waves that cause changes 
in the CCTV camera that cause changes to the wire that results in pictures on a screen 
recorded on a tape. The pictures carry information about what went on in the mall and they 
do so whether or not anyone actually sees them. 
At this point, we can introduce a typology of signs or signifiers that is helpful in clarifying the 
relationship between information and meaning. A simple event is an occurrence that carries 
information about its cause but is not observed and so is not interpreted by anyone. An event that 
is observed becomes a sign and carries information for the observer. We can say that is signifies 
its cause and has import for its observer. Signs bear a direct relation to what they signify – e.g., 
the paw print, or the darkening clouds. Symbols are signs that bear an indirect relation to what 
they signify. They rely on an agreed connotative structure (syntax and semantics) to carry 
information – e.g., blue on a map; a petrol gauge; numbers; computer data. Finally, utterances 
are actual linguistic communications between people that reveal the intent of the speaker and 
have import for the listener. 
With this typology we can make a number of important distinctions. First, the distinction 
between data and information can be made clear. Data is a collection of symbols brought 
together because they are considered relevant to some purposeful activity. Each symbol, or item 
of data, carries some information. It is not the same as the information, nor is information the 
result of some processing of the data. In the information systems context, data will usually be 
symbolic (numeric, linguistic, or graphic) utterances, produced in the system for a particular 
purpose. 
Second, we can distinguish two different usages of the term “meaning,” and distinguish them 
both from “information.” There is the idea of a system of meaning – for instance, the publicly 
available meanings within a language that enable sentences to be meaningful. Within the 
typology, this is the system of connotation that underlies a symbolic message. Second there is 
                                       
1More formally, Dretske [17, p. 65] puts this as: A signal r carries the information that s is F if and only if the 
conditional propability that s is F, given r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1). Where r is a signal; “s is F” 
means that some particular state of affairs, F, obtains; and k is any prior knowledge of the observer about the 
possible states of affairs - this may well be zero. 
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the specific meaning that a listener gains from a particular utterance, and that a speaker intends, 
which is possibly different. Within the typology, these are the import and the intent respectively. 
The “meaning” (import) of an utterance is clearly distinct from the information (signification) it 
carries. For example, the utterance “Yes, I killed her” has the same meaning whether spoken in a 
courtroom or on the stage but carries very different information and can lead to very different 
outcomes – the actress will not end up in jail. Conversely, in reply to the question “Did you go to 
the pub last night?” the answers “No, I stayed in” and “No, I went to the cinema” carry (some of) 
the same information but have different meanings.  
We can now see the process by which the information carried by a sign or utterance is 
transformed into meaning (import) for the receiver. This is a process of digitalizing the analogue. 
Signs impinge on the sensory system and carry their information in rich, analogue form (think of 
a photograph). The nervous system strips away much of the detail to focus on a particular level. 
The result is the semantic content of the information carried by the sign - that information, and 
only that information, held in digital form [17, p. 177]. The latter qualification is important for 
distinguishing between digitalization carried out in a meaningful, intentional way by humans 
from digitalization carried out by machines, such as cameras, thermostats, and computers. A 
further characteristic of the semantic content is that it must have some effect or action within the 
receiver, even if only internally. This semantic content is the meaning (import) generated from 
the available information. 
This approach suggests that information systems as usually conceived are but a part of the wider 
systems of “meaning processing” which human beings inhabit. 
Forms of Knowledge 
From the theory of information and meaning developed in the previous section, we can move on 
to look at the relation with knowledge and thereby truth. Dretske certainly envisages this 
connection, titling his book “Knowledge and the Flow of Information” as we will discuss shortly.  
The first thing to be said is that, in everyday speech, the word “knowledge”, or more actively “to 
know”, are used in a multiplicity of ways: “I know it’s raining”; “I know her well”; “I know how 
to ride a bike”; “I know there’s a train at 3.00”; I know I left my key there”; “I know the 
feeling”; I know what black holes are”; “I know how to make a presentation”; “I know how the 
system works”; “I know linear algebra”. There is unlikely to be a single, uni-dimensional theory 
that could do justice to all these different semantics, but we can at least present a degree of 
classification.  
Generally, I will be talking about knowledge in the subjective sense, that is, in terms of an 
individual and what they know. Knowledge also exists in an objective sense as embodied in 
books, films, organizational practices and procedures, the internet etc. (World 3 in Popper’s 
sense [57]) but this ultimately depends on the knowledge of the individuals and groups who 
generate it and then access it. The biggest library in the world “knows” nothing even if it 
contains all knowledge. Polyani [55] argues that all knowledge has a personal dimension; that all 
knowing is personal knowing; and that all focal knowledge relies on a background of tacit 
knowledge. 
There are some dimensions that all usages of “to know” have in common. First, any form of 
knowledge must be knowledge of something. There must always be an object of knowledge 
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although by no means  necessarily a material or physical object. In the above examples, such 
objects include states of affairs, people, skills, values, feelings and emotions, social practices, 
organizations and complex physical entities [4]. Nevertheless, there must be some object of 
knowledge and this connects immediately with critical realism. Knowledge itself, especially as it 
is an individual person’s knowledge, is always in the transitive 2 dimension but the objects of 
knowledge, even where they are concepts or ideas, are intransitive – objects available for 
investigation or debate. 
Second, there must always be a source of knowledge – knowledge must come from somewhere, 
generally some aspect of a person’s experience. Some possible sources of knowledge are: direct 
perception, a message or communication, learning as in a language, practice as in a skill, simple 
experience over time. It is here that the most direct connections with information and meaning 
come – information can be a source of knowledge, and existing knowledge shapes the 
information that is available from a source.  
Related to this is the third dimension – the way the knowledge is stored or represented, 
particularly in terms of the degree of tacitness/explicitness. Some knowledge will be entirely 
conscious and exp licit – we know we know it and can express it clearly. Some knowledge will 
have a degree of tacitness [55] – we have the knowledge but are not necessarily fully conscious 
of it, or fully able to articulate it. For instance, we can speak a language without knowing the 
rules that govern it; or we can use a carpenter’s plane and know when the blade needs changing. 
Finally, much of our knowledge, especially at a perceptual/motor level but also at higher levels 
as well [50], is embodied at a pre-conscious level. It governs or shapes what we can be conscious 
of.  
Fourth, and most importantly, they differ in the nature or form  of knowledge involved. It seems 
possible to identify at least four substantively different types of knowledge that cover the range 
of common uses of the term. I shall call these: propositional, experiential, performative and 
epistemological. 
One very important facet of knowledge is its truth. This is supposedly what distinguishes 
knowledge from simply belief or opinion. However, the nature of truth is a very complex 
question and differs between different forms of knowledge so I shall leave this discussion until 
after I have considered the different types of knowledge. 
Propositional Knowledge 
This form of knowledge is our everyday, commonsense, relatively direct awareness of the world 
around us. To know in this sense is to know that - to be aware of or to be cognizant of states of 
affairs. It is to know that it is raining, that there is someone at the door, that there is a train at 
12.15, that there are 35 widgets in stock, or that the petrol tank is half-full. I call it propositional 
knowledge, in comparison with the other forms, because it is generally explicit and conscious, 
and can be represented in the form of propositional statements: “I know that x is or will be the 
case”.  
                                       
2 Bhaskar [5, p. 10]distinguishes between the transitive domain of science – the domain of human production such 
as theories, papers, experiments which are clearly subject-dependent, and the intransitive domain of science – the 
domain of objects and structures about which we theorize and gain knowledge.  
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We gain propositional knowledge from several sources. This first is our direct perception of the 
world, through any of the senses. In philosophy, this kind of direct knowledge of things is called 
de re as opposed to that which we are told about – de dicto. In fact, Dretske, whose work we 
drew on earlier, actually restricts his theory of knowledge to only this kind of direct perceptual 
knowledge generated by the receipt of signs carrying information. But I shall include more 
generally knowledge of states of affairs that we are told about through a linguistic (or indeed 
non-verbal) communication, and knowledge we get through books, papers, timetables and so on.  
Such knowledge is generally objective in the sense that the object of knowledge is independent 
of the particular person involved and could be verified by others.  
Experiential Knowledge 
We talk about knowing in this sense when we are referring to our own individual previous 
experience, particularly of people, places, events or feelings. To know in this sense is to be 
acquainted with or to be familiar with. Thus, I know Mary Scott, I know Birmingham, I know 
“that feeling”, I don’t know your school, or I know how bad toothache can be.  
Knowing in this sense is a statement about the experience that someone has had, or not had, in 
the past. The depth of knowledge concerned is very variable – in saying “I know Mary Scott” I 
might just mean I know who she is, or I might mean that I know her very well. This form of 
knowledge is not primarily propositional. We can always make a propositional statement about it 
– “It is true that I know Mary Scott” but this is a second level statement the object of which is 
our first level experiential knowledge. We do not say “I know that Mary Scott.” 
Knowledge in this sense can be much richer and deeper than simple propositional knowledge. To 
know someone is not simply to know that they exist, it is to have a complex set of 
understandings, experiences, feeling and beliefs about that person. Much of this may be tacit and 
difficult to express explicitly. It is also deeply personal or subjective since my experience of a 
person or place may be very different from someone else’s. 
Performative Knowledge 
Performative knowledge involves having some skill or competence in order to be able to do 
something – it is to know how rather than to know or to know that [55, 64]. I include in this 
category much more than simple physical skills. So, we can talk of knowing how to ride a bike; 
knowing how to play the piano; knowing how to speak a language; knowing how to “play the 
game” as in office politics or a sport; knowing how to parent; or knowing how to cook. 
What distinguishes this type of knowledge is that it goes beyond simple experience of something 
to involve particular skills and abilities that have to be learnt over a period of time. It generally 
involves explicit training in order to develop the necessary skills. I call it performative because it 
usually involves some kind of physical motor skills, some kind  of performance – it goes beyond 
knowledge in a purely conceptual sense. For example, one could know plenty of the theory of 
music without being able to play the piano, and in its turn playing the piano does not mean that 
you can play the violin. Each skill has to be learnt over time and through practice – it is 
inscriptive rather than intellective [33]. 
This in turn means that performative knowledge is inherently embodied [50, 74] – that is it exists 
as dispositions or connective states of the body and nervous system itself and may well be pre-
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conscious. Even higher level skills such as language [39, 43, 44] or cognitive/ mathematical 
activities such as navigation [35] have significant bodily aspects. I once observed, at an airport, 
an English girl talking to her English friend. Their conversation was typically quiet and low-key. 
She then struck up a conversation with an Italian woman and it turned out she was herself half-
Italian and could speak Italian. Her whole manner and disposition changed instantly becoming 
louder, more emotional, and much more animated as she unconsciously switched from being 
English to being Italian.  
Generally, experiential knowledge is evaluated in terms of practical success or failure rather than 
truth. Can one actually ride the bike; play the piano or converse in Italian? Although of course, 
there will be degrees of ability in many of these activities. Dreyfus [18] presents a useful analysis 
from a phenomenological viewpoint of the development of skills from novice to expert.  
Epistemological Knowledge 
By epistemological knowledge, I am signaling a move away from the everyday knowing that 
things are the case towards deeper understandings of why things are as they are. It is to know 
why, to be knowledgeable about, to know the truth of, to be certain of, or to understand. It can be 
seen as related to or a development of propositional knowledge and I would include within this 
category what we call scientific knowledge – very much the subject of critical realism. I have 
called it epistemological knowledge to indicate that it is the most self-conscious about its validity 
and, more than the other forms of knowledge, is centrally characterized by its concern for truth. 
This form of knowledge goes beneath the surface of what appears to be the case, the domain of 
the empirical, to be able to account for the empirical in terms of underlying reasons or causes. I 
would not want this to be seen in terms of some simple-minded, linear model of cause and effect. 
It is also useful to draw on Aristotle ’s Four Causes (Physics II, 3) or ways of explaining why 
things are as they are. The formal cause or underlying nature of something - what is it to be an x? 
The material cause or structure of something – what is x made of? The final cause or purpose of 
something – what is x for? And the efficient cause or causal grounds for something – what has 
generated x. Examples here are: to know how a diesel engine works, to know why inflation is 
falling, to know the difference between right and wrong, or to know “What Freud Really Said” to 
quote a well known book. 
This type of knowledge is in some ways the obverse of performative knowledge as it is almost 
entirely explicit and discursive and is judged in terms of its correctness rather than its success. It 
can be knowledge of an everyday kind – knowing how something works, but in the main it refers 
to scholarly knowledge that is generated according to well-defined procedures or methodologies. 
However, I do not only include knowledge of material things. Of equal importance [28, 30] is 
knowledge of the social world and the personal world, both valid interpretations of others and 
undistorted understanding of one’s self [65]. 
Truth 
Continually underlying this discussion of knowledge has been the implicit question of the 
relation between knowledge and truth. One of the most traditional debates in philosophy has 
been that of epistemology – that is the study of knowledge (episteme) as opposed to mere belief 
or opinion (doxa). When are we entitled to say I know something to be the case rather than 
merely I believe it to be so? We may all believe certain states of affairs to be the case, or that we 
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know how to do certain things, but ultimately in order to be knowledge these beliefs must be 
testable or able to be validated in some way, that is, there must be grounds for them to be 
considered to be true.  
We will now consider the main theories of truth as found in philosophy. Note that most theories 
concern the truth of propositions, and so only really apply to propositional and epistemological 
knowledge in our terms.  
The most common view, in Western philosophy anyway, is that knowledge is true, justified, 
belief (TJB). This stems from Plato’s Theaetetus where Socrates argues that: 
 “When, therefore, anyone forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you 
may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and 
receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational 
explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge” (my emphases) 
Although going on to point out the self-referential difficulty of “knowing” what is a rational 
explanation. These three conditions have been taken to be both necessary and sufficient for a 
proposition to count as knowledge. In other words, to validly assert “I know that p …” implies: 
· You must sincerely believe that p is the case. 
· You must have justifiable grounds, evidence, or explanation for p. 
· p must, indeed, be true. 
Although this sounds clear, there are in fact many problems with each condition as well as their 
conjunction. For instance, there is much debate about what would constitute proper justification 
for such a belief - empirical evidence, rational argument, personal experience, perception or 
what? How in any case can we determine if something is actually true? There are a whole range 
of theories of truth – correspondence, confirmation, coherence or consensus, not to mention 
sceptics (e.g., [62]) who would deny the possibility of truth in the first place. Indeed we might 
say that the question of truth is actually the same question as that of knowledge so defining 
knowledge in terms of truth makes little progress.  
There is also the Gettier problem that provides cases where each of the conditions holds but we 
would still not wish to call it knowledge [23]. For example, suppose you walk in to a room and 
think you see your friend John. You believe it to be John; you have grounds for believing it (he 
looks like John); but suppose you are mistaken and it is actually John’s twin brother Mark. It 
would appear that the third condition is not met and you do not therefore “know” that John is in 
the room even though you believe it to be the case. Suppose however that John is actually in the 
room but hidden round the corner so you do no t see him. Now the third condition becomes true, 
even though you are not aware of it, and so you are entitled to say you know, even though you 
are actually mistaken! One way out of this problem is provided by Dretske’s theory as will be 
shown below. 
General Theories of Truth 
I shall briefly summarize the main philosophical theories of truth: 
· Correspondence theories [56, 63, 71, 78] are the main and most obvious view of truth. 
They hold that truth (and falsity) is applied to propositions depending on whether  the 
proposition corresponds to the way the world it. It thus applies to the relationship 
between a proposition and the states of affairs it describes. Problems with this view are: i) 
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in what sense can a linguistic statement be said to correspond to something quite different 
– an occurrence in the world? ii) We cannot directly access the external world so we are 
only ever comparing experiences and statements with other experiences and statements, 
so that we can never actually determine if a proposition is, in fact, true. Most other 
theories stem from the problems in maintaining a correspondence theory. 
· Coherence theories [10, 58, 59] stress the extent to which a proposition is consistent with 
other beliefs, theories and evidence that we have. The more that it fits in with other well-
attested ideas the more we should accept it as true. This approach avoids the need for a 
direct comparison with “reality”. However, it is more concerned with the justification of 
beliefs rather than their absolute truth. From a Kuhnian [38] perspective, fitting in with 
the current paradigm does not make the current paradigm correct. Quine held that 
coherent systems of beliefs were under-determined by empirical data and thus that no 
theory could ever ultimately be verified or falsified. 
· Pragmatic theories [36, 54, 61] hold that truth is best seen in terms of how useful or 
practical a theory is - that which best solves a problem is the best theory. A version of 
this is instrumentalism, which holds that a theory is simply an instrument for making 
predictions, and has no necessary connection to truth at all. This also leads into consensus 
theories. An obvious argument against this view is that a true theory is likely to be most 
useful and powerful3 and therefore should be an important component of a useful theory. 
· Consensus or discursive theories [26] accept that truth is that which results from a 
process of enquiry resulting in a consensus amongst those most fully informed – in the 
case of science, scientists. At one level, we can see that this must be the case if we accept 
with critical realism the impossibility of proving correspondence truth. But, today’s 
accepted truth is usually tomorrow’s discarded theory and so this does not guarantee 
truth. See the discussion below about Habermas’ more recent views. 
· Redundancy and deflationary theories [22, 34, 60] argue that the whole concept of truth is 
actually redundant. If we say “it is true that snow is white” we are saying no more than 
that “snow is white”, the two propositions will always have the same truth values and are 
therefore equivalent. This seems to me largely a linguistic move as it does not touch upon 
the question of how we might know or believe that a proposition is actually the case.  
· Performative theories [69] also deal with the linguistic use of the term. The suggestion 
here is that by saying “p is true” we are not so much commenting on the truth of the 
proposition as such but on our willingness or intention of accepting it as true and 
commending it to someone else. Again, this just seems to ignore large areas of the 
question of truth.  
Critical Realism and Truth 
Turning now to critical realism, what view of truth does it espouse? The first thing to say is that 
in general the whole approach is “fallibilist”. That is, since it accepts epistemic relativity, the 
                                       
3 Although postmodernists argue that it is the theory that is deemed most powerful that is accepted as true. 
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view that all knowledge is ultimately historically and locally situation, it has to accept that 
theories can never be proved or known certainly to be true. Thus, if provable truth were to be 
made a necessary criteria for kno wledge there could be no knowledge within critical realism. 
Bhaskar does briefly discuss the notion of truth and comes up with a multivalent view involving 
four components or dimensions [7, p. 62] that could apply to a judgment about the truth or falsity 
of something: 
A. Normative-fiduciary: Truth as being that which is believed from a trustworthy source – “trust 
me, I believe it, act on it.” This sense would typically occur within a communication where 
the speaker states a proposition and the listener accepts their sincerity.  
B. Adequating: Based on evidence and justification rather than just belief – “there’s sound 
evidence for this.” This goes beyond just the speaker’s belief to warranted assertability but 
can still, of course, be false. 
C. Referential-expressive: Corresponding to or at least being adequate to some intransitive 
object of knowledge. Whereas the first two dimensions are clearly in the transitive dimension 
and strongly tied to language, this aspect moves beyond to posit some sort of relation 
between language and a referent.  
D. Ontological and alethic: This final level is the most controversial as it moves truth entirely 
into the intransitive domain. The truth of things in themselves, and their generative causes. It 
is no longer tied to language although expressible in language. 
Several comments need to be made here. First, the first three are relatively unproblematic and 
quite similar to the TJB formula although set within a communicative context. “This proposition 
is believable” (B); “don’t just listen to me there is some evidence for it” (J); and “it fits the facts” 
(T); none of these in themselves or, indeed, together guarantees that it is true.  
Second, Bhaskar sees them as ordered or progressive. Thus, the weakest form of truth is simply 
to have to believe someone with no further justification. Better, is to have some sort of warranted 
assertability, some evidence justifying the claim, although what the evidence is and how strong it 
is are debatable points. Better still, there should be some theory, description, or model that can be 
related to real-world structures. This obviously moves in the direction of some sort of 
correspondence theory of truth. Critical realism does tend towards this view whilst accepting 
inevitable limitations on it [65]. 
Third, the ontological/alethic aspect marks a major shift as it no longer concerns propositions at 
all. It is not predicated of a proposition but is said to be a characteristic the “real” nature and 
causes of things in themselves: “truth as alethic, i.e., the truth of or reason for things, people and 
phenomena generally (including in science most importantly causal structures and generative 
mechanisms), not propositions.” [7, p. 64].  
Habermas’s Theory of Truth 
We can now move to consider Habermas’s theories of knowledge and truth. His early work is 
known as the theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (KCI) [26]. This suggested that humans, 
as a species, had needs for, or interests in, three particular forms of knowledge. The technical 
interest in moulding nature led to the empirical and physical sciences. For Habermas these were 
underpinned by a pragmatist philosophy of science (inspired by Peirce) and a consensus theory 
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of truth. The practical interest in communication and mutual understanding led to the histo rical 
and interpretive sciences underpinned by a hermeneutic criterion of understanding. And the 
emancipatory interest in self-development and authenticity led to critical science which 
identified repressions and distortions in knowledge and in society. Its criterion of success was the 
development of insight and self-expression free from constraint.  
This theory of transcendental interests was the subject of much criticism (see Mingers [48] for a 
review), and Habermas later transmuted it into the theory of communicative action (TCA) [28, 
29]. Utterances and, I would argue, actions as well raise certain validity claims that must, if 
challenged, be justified. These claims are comprehensibility, truth, rightness and truthfulness 
(sincerity). This is premised on the argument that utterances stand in relation the three different 
“worlds” – the objective or material world that consists of all actual or possible states of affairs; 
the social or normative world that consists of accepted and legitimate norms of behavior; and the 
subjective or personal world that consists of individuals’ experiences and feelings.  
When such a claim is challenged, the process of justification must always be discursive or 
dialogical. That is there should ideally be a process of open debate unfettered by issues of power, 
resources, access and so on until agreement is reached by the “unforced force of the better 
argument” [25, p. 240, 31, p. 37], what Habermas calls the “ideal speech situation”. Thus, 
Habermas held a consensus or discursive view of truth both in the moral or normative domain of 
what ought we to do, as well as in the material domain of external reality. To say of a 
proposition, “it is true” is the same as saying of an action, “it is right”, namely ideal, warranted 
assertability.  
However, more recently Habermas [31] has returned to the issue of truth and now rejects his 
discursive theory for propositions about the material world in favor of one with an irreducible 
ontological component. In essence, Habermas now maintains that there is a substantive 
difference between the moral domain of normative validity which can only ever be established 
through discussion and debate within an ideal speech situation, and the domain of propositional 
truth where properly arrived at and justified agreement may still be proven wrong by later events.  
“I have given up an epistemic {based on reason and discussion – JM} conception of truth and 
have sought to distinguish more clearly between the truth of a proposition and its rational 
assertability (even under approximately ideal conditions).” [31, p. 8]  
Habermas accepts the basic realist view that there is a world independent of humans, that we all 
experience the same world, and that this places constraints upon us, whilst accepting that our 
access to this world is inevitable conditioned or filtered through our concepts and language. This, 
of course, leads to the age-old dilemma of trying to discover some external standpoint, outside of 
language and cognition, from which to judge the truth of one’s propositions. The idea of ideal 
rational discourse is not wholly wrong, but is insufficient for the task (p. 252). Whilst it is 
necessary that we come to believe or accept the truth of propositions through a thorough process 
of rational discourse, that we do so is not sufficient to guarantee their truth. Even the most 
strongly held and well-justified views may turn out to be false.  
“These objections have prompted me to revise the discursive conception of rational 
acceptability by relating it to a pragmatically conceived, nonepistemic concept of truth, but 
without thereby assimilating ‘truth’ to ‘ideal assertability’” [31p. 38] (original emphasis) 
The basic outline of this nonepistemic concept of truth has a very Popperian ring to it. If we 
begin with our everyday purposeful activities within the lifeworld, we can see that our perceptual 
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and conceptual apparatus unavoidably shapes our access to reality – we never meet it naked – but 
at the same time our interactions, and particularly our failures, lead us to revise our conceptual 
structure. In the lifeworld, whilst engaged in action, we presume and do not question the truths of 
the propositions we operate under. Only when these break down do we move from action to 
discourse and offer our beliefs up for debate and justification. Once we have become convinced 
of the truth of a proposition through the process of rational discourse we can then move back and 
adopt it within the sphere of engaged action. It is important in this process that the reasons we 
adduce for coming to believe a proposition are actually related to the experiences that have led us 
to question and debate. Within the true, justified belief definition of knowledge, the justification 
must stem from the actual experiential learning that has occurred rather than being ad hoc or 
coincidental as in the Gettier example above. 
Habermas’s move away from an epistemic conception of truth is actually towards an ontological 
one. When we make what we take to be true assertions we are expressing beliefs that certain 
states of affairs do actually exist, and these in turn refer to entities or relations that do actually 
exist and establish a relation between truth and reference; between the truth of statements and 
aspects of an objective world. This is so even between different linguistic communities (spatial 
or temporal) where the same referents, the same objects of discourse, may well go under 
different descriptions. “The experience of ‘coping’ accounts for two determinations of ‘objectivity’: the 
fact that the way the world is is not up to us; and the fact that it is the same  for all of us” [31, p. 254]. 
This does not of course guarantee that the “knowledge” is true – Habermas is fallibilist in the 
same way that Bhaskar is: 
“Insofar as knowledge is justified based on a learning process that overcomes previous errors 
but does not protect from future ones, any current state of knowledge remains relative to the 
best possible epistemic situation at the time” [31, p. 41]. 
Habermas’s move is certainly welcome from a critical realist position. One criticism was always 
that his view of natural science was overly pragmatic or even instrumental. He tended to call it 
“empirical-analytic” and this, combined with the consensus theory of truth, lost touch with a 
realist view of ontology. It also meant that he was essentially anti-naturalist, seeing a radical 
disjunction between natural science and social science. This shift to some extent addresses both 
issues: accepting a causally constraining reality as discussed above; and accepting a “weak 
naturalism” [31, p. 22] that there is an underlying evolutionary continuity between the objective 
world and the lifeworld, between nature and culture. 
However, I would argue that he does not go far enough in this direction, and more specifically 
remains too strongly wedded to the idea that validity claims, including those of (nonepistemic) 
truth, are validated linguistically. In the model described above, problems and failures in the 
world of action lead to a switch to the world of discourse wherein questions of truth are decided 
through debate. Now whilst I accept that humans do always interact within language that is not 
to say that all activity is linguistic. Within the realm of epistemological knowledge (i.e., science) 
experimental activity is clearly the cornerstone of progress. With performative knowledge, the 
measure is successful performance whether it is a motor skill such as riding or a social skill such 
as conducting a meeting. And with experiential knowledge claims to have had a particular 
experience can be investigated forensically, i.e., through some form of “detective” work. Thus, 
the results of activity and action will inform the linguistic debates. 
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Summary 
As can be sees, truth is a highly complex and debatable concept. I would like to pull out the 
following general conclusions in leading on to consider the relations between knowledge and 
truth. 
· The underlying conception of truth, supported by both Bhaskar and Habermas, is a limited 
form of correspondence theory. As realists, we accept the existence of an independent or 
intransitive domain of objects of knowledge that have causal effect and thereby confirm or 
disconfirm our knowledge. We also have to accept, however, that we can never have pure 
unmediated access to this domain and thus that our knowledge is always provisional and 
subject to change. 
· This places the emphasis on the degree of warrantability or justification that there is for 
something claiming to be knowledge. Is it a matter of believing a trustworthy source? 
Seeking supporting evidence? Witnessing a demonstration? Or conducting extensive 
scientific research?  
· Here, some of the other theories of truth come into play. As Habermas emphasizes, all truth 
claims are ultimately validated discursively through discussion and debate. Even when the 
intransitive world appears to refute some theory, say through failed experiments, it is the 
community of scientists who decide why the experiment is failing and at what point it 
becomes conclusive [13]. Thus, there is always an element of consensus about truth claims. 
Another form of support is the extent to which a theory is consistent with other well- attested 
knowledge – i.e., its coherence. But of course we have to recognize that innovations often 
contradict the perceived wisdom. 
Success in practice (i.e., pragmatism) also provides support for a theory although whilst a 
true theory should be successful it does not follow that a successful theory is true.  
· Another type of validity, particular for proposition knowledge, is that it is caused by 
information in the sense described above since information is only information if it is true. Or 
put the other way round, the information that a sign or messages carries is that which is true, 
given the occurrence of the sign. This is discussed more below as an answer to the Gettier 
problem. 
Knowledge and Truth 
In this section, I want to put forward ideas about how the different forms of knowledge relate to 
truth. 
There is not one form of knowledge but several distinct types with different characteristics.  
These differ in terms of their nature, their source, their form of representation, and their criteria 
for validity. Truth as usually understood does not apply equally to all of them. See Table 1 for a 
summary. 
 
Table 1 Forms of Knowledge and Truth  
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Actual human knowledge can never be certain or known to be correct (even an actually true 
theory could not be proved to be true). From a critical realist perspective, this is because we can 
never have pure unmediated access to the intransitive domain; from a Habermasian perspective, 
ultimate truth could only emerge from a never-ending, impossibly perfect discourse although 
now mediated by interactions with a constraining outer world. We therefore need to think of 
knowledge in terms of degrees of confidence and warrantability or justification rather than pure 
truth. 
We can ally the different forms of knowledge with the different validity or truth claims.  
Performative knowledge can best be judged by its actual success or failure. A claim to be able 
to do something, whether a physical skill or a social role, can only be vindicated by a 
performance. In some ways, this is actually quite close to Bhaskar’s concept of alethic truth that I 
critiqued above. To demonstrate that one is a pianist by actually performing validates itself 
without need of propositions or assertions. Even here, there are of course degrees of performance 
and competence. We can also bring in here Habermas’s validity claim of comprehensibility. 
Before a speech act or indeed any other social action can be judged it must be understood, that is 
it must be performed in a competent manner. Habermas draws on Chomsky’s [12] notion of a 
competent speaker of a language [27, p. 29] but this can be enlarged to cover all the aspects of 
performative knowledge.  
Experiential knowledge must ultimately come down to a matter of Habermas’s truthfulness or 
sincerity (normative-fiduciary in Bhaskar’s terms) since it concerns a particular person’s 
experiences or feelings. Of course, one does not just have to accept a person’s discursive 
justification, one might try to discover or provide some sort of evidence or justification as well 
which could include documentary evidence – letters, photos, transcripts, etc., or corroboration 
from other people. 
Propositional knowledge is explicit knowledge concerning the presence or absence of particular 
states of affairs – truth for Habermas, referential-expressive for Bhaskar. Here we can go beyond 
belief and even justification towards confirming a relation between the proposition and the 
intransitive world to which it refers. Indeed, if we follow Dretske we can see a direct causal 
relation between information and the knowledge that it generates. The information carried by the 
petrol gauge (which must be true to be information) leads us to know that the tank is nearly 
empty and so our knowledge in this case is true justified belief. 
Indeed, this is a potential way out of the Gettier problem mentioned above and in relation to 
Habermas’s theory. If we take the example of the twins above, the problem was that whilst it was 
true that John was in the room it was not this fact that actually caused it to be believed. Rather it 
was the mistaken sighting of Mark. Following our theory of information we can say that a belief 
is only justified if it is actually caused by information (which by our definition must always be 
true – false information is not information but misinformation). Thus, we are not entitled to 
claim we know John is in the room, even though he is, since our belief was generated by a 
misinterpretation of information from the sight of Mark rather than actual information from a 
sight of John. 
Even so, we cannot finally prove our knowledge is true for we might be mistaken either in our 
interpretation of the sign (the gauge might actually read half full), or in believing it was (true) 
information when in fact it was not (the gauge was faulty). 
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Epistemological knowledge takes us to the realm of science where its primary characteristic is 
the huge effort in trying to ensure that the knowledge generated is reliable even whilst accepting 
that we can never be certain of it. This is ontological (incorporating a causal explanation) truth 
for Bhaskar. The key feature distinguishing this from propositional knowledge is the need to go 
beyond immediate appearances to form an underlying explanation of why might be as they 
appear. This is not confined to the material world but applies equally to Habermas’s social and 
personal worlds. In the social world we are interested in explaining why certain norms or  
patterns of behavior exist and are maintained, and perhaps why others are not. In the personal 
world we want to understand why a person behaves as they do, why they do certain things and 
not others.  
I should like to end with one final comment. The paper has been concerned with analyzing 
several different forms or types of knowledge but of course, in real-world situations and 
activities these different types will typically be involved together and will interact with each 
other. To take just one example, suppose you are chairing a meeting. This will draw on 
propositional knowledge about particular facts and states of affairs; experiential knowledge of 
people, events, and practices; performative knowledge, perhaps of body language and physical 
gestures; and epistemological knowledge perhaps of economics or a particular industrial process.  
Conclusions 
The contributions of this paper have been primarily theoretical.  
The first is to recognize the multidimensional nature of what we can know. Most KM literature 
implicitly assumes that knowledge is an integral, easily definable, commodity that can be 
extracted, stored and transmitted relatively easily. The literature that does not either presumes it 
to be some form of processed information; or categorizes it on a single dimension such as 
tacit/explicit; or argues that it is too complex to manage at all. In contrast, this paper has 
proposed a polyvalent view of knowledge that recognizes four distinctively different forms of 
knowledge – propositional, experiential, performative and epistemological – based on several 
different dimensions. It is argued that this typology does justice to the rich and varied ways in 
which people may be said “to know” something. 
The second is to point out the intimate connection between knowledge and truth which is rarely 
discussed in the KM literature. Knowledge, to be knowledge rather than simply opinion, raises 
claims as to its truth or validity. Truth, too, turns out to be a complex concept and within the 
paper it has been explored from a critical realist perspective. This grounds its concept of truth in 
terms of correspondence to an external, independent reality but recognizes that epistemologically 
knowledge is always provisional and relative. If truth can never be known with certainty then 
great emphasis must be paid to questions of justification and warrantability. What would lead us 
to accept a knowledge claim – accepting the trustworthiness of the source; witnessing an event; 
gathering evidence; or its consistency with our other beliefs? 
This leads to the view that the different forms of knowledge imply different forms of truth or, 
rather, different way of justifying their claim to truth. Propositional knowledge of day-to-day 
states of affairs can be directly justified in terms of the (true) information that generates it. 
Performative knowledge can be justified by a successful performance. Experiential knowledge 
can be justified through the sincerity of the claimant or the discovery of adequate evidence. 
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While epistemological knowledge  brings in the full force of science, whether it be natural or 
social. 
Before moving on to some practical implications I would like to make it clear that although this 
paper has concentrated on the subjective aspects of knowledge – the knowing subject, and  has 
primarily developed somewhat static categorizations, I see this as only part of a much broader 
domain that is both processual and social. In terms of process, events in the world carry 
information and lead to experiences that generate meaning, ideas and knowledge for individuals. 
At the same time, as Tuomi [72] indicated, our knowledge, and more generally our cognitive 
structure, conditions both how we experience events and what information is available to us from 
them. This dynamic interactive process involves the material world but even more significantly 
the social world. As individuals, we exist in multiple social networks or forms of life [77] and 
much of our everyday knowledge is actually intersubjectively shared knowledge about acting 
effectively within these social systems. 
In terms of the practice of knowledge management, I would draw two general conclusions. First, 
there is the sheer richness and variety of forms of knowledge and, significantly, the fact that in 
real situations they all interact together. This means that, except for fairly well-defined domains 
where knowledge can be easily codified and represented, managing knowledge is vastly different 
from managing information and requires sophisticated and people- intensive activities that can 
only be mediated or facilitated by information and communication technologies. It is interesting 
to realize that the major form of institutionalized knowledge management is actually education. 
Here we have a massively complex and highly resourced system devoted entirely to generating 
knowledge, capturing and storing knowledge, instilling it into pupils and students over many 
years, and finally testing and certifying their capabilities and competencies. This gives some idea 
of the difficulty of the task, and should make us wary of those who peddle quick- fix knowledge 
management systems to unwary organizations. 
Second, stemming from considerations of truth, is the importance of the whole process of 
validating and warranting knowledge claims in order to ensure that we are working with genuine 
“knowledge” rather than simply unsubstantiated belief or unwarranted contentions. In February 
2004, Google [11] estimated that it now covered 4.3 billion pages of information on the internet. 
Certainly, you can search for any topic imaginable and almost certainly discover many pages 
devoted to that subject. So, there is no shortage of putative knowledge but the question becomes, 
how reliable is any of it? Is a particular page the polemical beliefs of someone with extreme 
views? Is it well meaning but unsubstantiated suppositions? Is it reasonably well accepted 
commonsense advice? Or, is it substantive theoretical conclusions based on peer-reviewed 
research? Internet sites need certificates of validity in the same way that they have certificates of 
safety.   
The importance of reliability and trust can also be exemplified with the operation of the e-Bay 
auction site. One of the strongest features of this is the feedback process that occurs after every 
transaction. Both buyer and seller are expected to complete feedback on each other detailing how 
happy they were with the transaction. This feedback then becomes publicly available as a record 
of the trustworthiness of each person. Once built up reputations become very important, 
especially for sellers, and have a very strong effect in ensuring good behavior all round.  
Knowledge is certainly a vital resource in today’s world but we must recognize its complex 
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